Phenomenological Research
V. Mott
The Chanllenge of Phenomenological Research: From Philosophical Ideals To Practice
Vivian Wilson Mott
University of Georgia
Phenomenology is a unique qualitative research strategy, and an appropriate means of capturing the dynamics of human phenomena. The philosophical roots of this methodology, however, pose particular challenges for the researcher seeking to better understand the lived experience of others. This paper explores the Husserlean philosophical foundations of phenomenology, outlines the key principles of epoch, reduction, bracketing, and creative synthesis, and distinguishes among different phases and types of phenomenological research. The paper presents a unique challenge perceived by this author, and suggests an appropriate response to that issue.
Introduction:
My interest in phenomenological inquiry grew out of three personal perceptions: first, an unsatisfied puzzlement and curiosity with philosophy; second, a long-standing belief that all knowledge and understanding are culturally produced, contextually bound, and personally interpreted; and third, a personal revelation that I had approached three previous research projects from a phenomenological perspective--without sufficient understanding of the philosophical underpinnings of qualitative research, or of why a phenomenological focus seemed so naturally appropriate. Thus, a merging of what I knew, that which I was yet unsure of, and knowing how much I didn't know prompted a search for further understanding.
Philosophical Foundations:
Phenomenology is both a "philosophy that considers anything appearing to consciousness as a legitimate field of inquiry" (Stewart & Mickunas, 1974, p. vii), and a specific research methodology that strives to portray phenomena from the personal and contextual perspectives of those who experience them. Patton observed:
The term phenomenology has become so widely used that its meaning has become confused. Sometimes phenomenology is viewed as a paradigm, sometimes as a philosophy or as a perspective, and it is sometimes even viewed as synonymous with qualitative methods or naturalistic inquiry. (1990, p. 68)
While I understood the phenomenological perspective of qualitative research, the challenge spoken of earlier was one of applying a phenomenological focus to my qualitative research.
As a distinct philosophical movement, phenomenology emerged largely from the philosophical views of Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl, late 19th century German mathematician and philosopher. Husserl's interest in philosophy was stimulated by the earlier concern of Rene Descartes regarding the rational justification of knowledge. However, instead of the Cartesian distinction between the act and the object of thinking, Husserlean philosophy considers the unique and virtual experience "Zu den sachen selbst" ("to the things themselves"), maintaining that the two must be considered together (Husserl, 1931, 1964). Husserl used the concept of experience to mean anything which we may be conscious or aware of:
natural objects, mathematical entities, values, affective states, volitions, moods, desires, feelings -- all these are things of which one is aware. All of these things Husserl calls phenomena. Phenomenology, then, became a program for a systematic investigation of the content of consciousness. (Stewart & Mickunas, 1974, p. 23)
Among the key principles in Husserl's development of phenomenology as a means of philosophical inquiry were the examination and suspension of all assumptions about the nature of any reality. Three terms emerged from Husserl's concept of phenomenological inquiry: epoch, reduction, and bracketing. Epoch, borrowed from the Greek skeptics, refers to the questioning of assumptions in order to fully examine a phenomenon.
Reduction is simply the consideration of only the basic elements of an inquiry without concern for what is accidental or trivial. Bracketing describes (in Husserl's mathematical terms) the differential setting aside of some portion of an inquiry, so as to look at the whole. These three concepts are often used synonymously to explain the suspended judgment necessary for phenomenological inquiry. From the Husserlean philosophical stance, only from this point of suspended judgment can inquiry proceed unencumbered from masked assumptions about the nature of the phenomena observed.
Husserl also addressed the complex issue of object/subject dualism prominent in earlier philosophical thought. According to Husserl, transcendental consciousness or subjectivity represents the inevitable juncture of object and subject--of the thinking self and the object of one's thoughts--in any inquiry. He used the terms "residue" or "pure consciousness" to describe that part of one's subjective consciousness which remains a part of any awareness or inquiry (1931, 1964). Although one's personal experience and cognitive response cannot be fully excluded, "bracketing demands a distance from all previously held theories and assumptions [in order to] become a nonparticipating observer of conscious experiences of the world. This means that he [sic] cannot base insights on traditional or well-established theories, whether philosophical or scientific, but on an immediate insight into the phenomena themselves" (Stewart & Mickunas, 1974, p. 36). Husserl further argued that the nature of subjectivity--or total involvement with a phenomenon--is not only what permits one to be objective, but represents the purest, richest form of objectivity. Thus, the recreated structural synthesis of the essence of any experience comes through examination and abstraction of relevant, invariant themes emerging from involvement with one's experience.
Phenomenological Method:
With growing philosophical and psychological interest in phenomenology, various theorists have interpreted Husserl's work on phenomenological inquiry (see for instance Douglass & Moustakas, 1985; Hycner, 1985; Ihde, 1977; Katz, 1987; Keen, 1975; Polkinghorne, 1989; Spiegelberg, 1965, 1975). Spiegelberg (1975), in particular, stressed that even though Husserl was indeed the fountainhead of the movement, ownership of the concept cannot be singularly claimed. Spiegelberg argued that the concept was in existence at least a century prior to Husserl's attention. He further maintained that Husserl's "identification of phenomenology with subjectivism [was] an unfortunate and unnecessary narrowing of its original objective, violating the ideal of freedom from unexamined presuppositions" (p. xxiii). Spiegelberg similarly recognized phenomenology as a philosophical position necessary for the full examination and expression of knowledge and understanding. Many believe, however, that Spiegelberg simplified this convoluted philosophical stance toward knowing with a simpler objective: the direct and presuppositional investigation of consciously lived experience, without contemplation of causal explanations and free from unexamined presuppositions regarding the phenomenon. And while Keen stressed that "unlike other methodologies, phenomenology cannot be reduced to a 'cookbook' set of instructions" (1975, p. 41), several additional guidelines are of benefit to the phenomenologist.
Spiegelberg (1965, 1975), for example, distinguished six phases of phenomenology which may either be considered types of phenomenology, with different goals and outcomes, or sequential steps in the phenomenological approach.
1. The most rudimentary type is descriptive phenomenology in which phenomena are explored, scrutinized and described so as to enrich our awareness of the richness of experience. Through this recognition of the value of human experience, the often perceived triviality of experience can be dismissed. This recognition has led to other research perspectives such as ethnography and ecological psychology.
2. Essential or eidetic phenomenology involves the intuitive exploration of phenomena, with the goal of uncovering the essential relationships and meanings embedded within them. This type of phenomenology may have evolved out of Husserl's mathematical background and his contribution of the concept of permutations. Applied to essential phenomenology, one imaginatively examines all the possible relationships and meaning structures within a phenomenon.
3. Spiegelberg cited the inexhaustible array of context and perspectives applicable to the human experience as an example of phenomenology of appearances. This type of phenomenology is particularly useful in calling attention to the novel or unexamined view of human experience. Phenomenology of appearances is especially useful in heuristic inquiry.
4. Constitutive phenomenology is concerned with the ways in which experience becomes constituted or established in human consciousness. This form of phenomenology is especially relevant in inductive inquiries of a historical or socio-cultural nature, wherein one examines how the meaning of an experience evolves or develops.
5. Reductive phenomenology is generally felt to be implicit in all other forms or phases of phenomenology. Reductive phenomenology, according to Spiegelberg (1975), is the "explicit act of suspension of judgment...which makes us stand back from the natural involvement in our everyday world...to give us access to entirely new 'horizons' of phenomena" (p. 68).
6. Finally, one unique form of phenomenology, known as hermeneutic phenomenology, is the discovery-producing form capable of uncovering hidden meanings of human experience which might not otherwise be perceived. While the development of both phenomenology and hermeneutics are often credited to German philosophers, hermeneutics alone has its disciplinary roots in both philosophy and theology. The two approaches further differ in that hermeneutics seeks to discover the context of that which is being studied so that its meaning can be interpreted, while phenomenology strives only to capture and understand the essence and structure of phenomena.
Spiegelberg emphasized that whether one considers the above forms in sequential order toward some end, or as subtly different approaches to phenomenological inquiry, "they are all aimed at giving us a fuller and deeper grasp of the phenomena" (1975, p.57).
The primary focus, then, of phenomenology as a research methodology is the understanding of the essential structures and meanings of a lived experience from the perspective of the one experiencing the phenomenon. Like any qualitative methodology, the purpose of phenomenology is to explain, rather than predict, and pose understanding rather than solve problems. While all strands of qualitative research share these goals to some extent, Bogdan and Biklen (1992) have argued that there "are differences in the degree to which qualitative researchers are concerned with this methodological and conceptual problem as well as differences in how they come to grips with it" (p. 35). Like Bogdan and Biklen, Patton (1990) has also observed that qualitative research is phenomenological in orientation, but that "conducting a study with a phenomenological focus (i.e., getting at the essence of the experience of some phenomenon) is different from using phenomenology to philosophically justify the methods of qualitative inquiry as legitimate in social science research. Both contributions are important" (p. 71). As a specific research approach, phenomenology has three important distinctions, again similar to all qualitative methodologies, but applied with a greater degree of attention and methodological purity. Phenomenological inquiry involves (a) the unassumptive and non-intervening study of a personally or socially significant phenomenon which (b) is investigated as a natural experience, rather than as a conceptualization, with the (c) goal of understanding characteristic and essential themes (Patton, 1990; van Manen, 1990). Most researchers find it both philosophically and pragmatically challenging to be phenomenologically idealistic. These very characteristics, and the philosophical ideals which undergird them, are primary sources of challenge and concern for the phenomenologist.
Methodological Challenge of Phenomenology:
Various challenges are routinely levied against qualitative research. For instance, the most basic question of validity asks whether any methodology can capture the dynamics of human experience, or promote a deeper understanding of any reality. Similarly, issues of randomness, limited sample size, and replicability have been addressed in sources more appropriate and lengthy than this. One issue, however, which is of significant concern to this researcher, focuses on the data themselves. This issue encompasses both an ethical consideration for the "claiming" of others' experiences (which is beyond the scope of this presentation), and the description and interpretation of those phenomena.
With a strength akin to his commitment to the inseparability of one's thinking self and the object of one's thought, Husserl (1931) also argued that any intervention--even recollection and dialogue--changes one's experience. Thus, the description of any experience, even the one related as it occurs, is already different than the experience itself. The limits of language, the nature of our subjective memories, the mere passage of time, and the inevitable layers of interpretation add to this entangling philosophical dilemma. Finally, the creative insight and synthesis of clusters of relevant data are particularly individualistic. Hence, the structural re-creation of one's understanding of phenomena is especially subject to unexamined assumptions and personal bias.
How does one respond to these challenges of phenomenological inquiry? I suggest that one basic response is the selection of the phenomenological method itself. With a deliberate resolve regarding the recognition, examination, and putting aside of presuppositions through the Husserlean principles of epoch, reduction, and bracketing, phenomenology offers the potential for the deepest understanding of human experience. These tenets, in addition to other "traditional" strategies such as methodological triangulation, member checks, and peer validation, offer at least the opportunity for phenomenological inquiry to more fully capture the dynamics of human experience.
References:
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